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Abstract
This Note examines subject matter jurisdiction in transnational securities fraud cases. The
approaches adopted by the circuit courts and the Draft Restatement are critically analyzed, and
the language and purpose of the Act are reviewed. A new test for determining subject matter
jurisdiction in a United States forum is proposed, which will result in a greater protection of
American and foreign investors who purchase and sell securities abroad.
EXPANDING THE JURISDICTIONAL BASIS FOR
TRANSNATIONAL SECURITIES FRAUD CASES:
A MINIMAL CONDUCT APPROACH
INTRODUCTION
The increase in international securities transactions in recent
years ' has been accompanied by a growing number of transnational
securities fraud schemes. 2 The Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) has utilized the Securities Exchange Act of 19343 (Act) to
counter international securities fraud, but the courts have yet to
develop jurisdictional principles which meet with widespread ac-
ceptance in this country. 4 The American Law Institute's Restate-
1. See Loomis & GRANT, The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, Financial
Institutions Outside the U.S. and Extraterritorial Application of the U.S. Securities Laws, 1
J. COMP. CORP. L. & SEC. REG. 3, 24 n.1 (1978).
2. See, e.g., lIT v. Cornfeld, 619 F.2d 909 (2d Cir. 1980); Fidenas A.G. v. Compagnie
Int'l, 606 F.2d 5 (2d, Cir. 1979); Continental Grain (Austi.) Pty. Ltd. v. Pacific Oilseeds,
Inc., 592 F.2d 409 (8th Cir. 1979); United States v. Cook, 573 F.2d 281 (5th Cir. 1978); Des
Brisay v. Goldfield Corp., 549 F.2d 133 (9th Cir. 1977); SEC v. Kasser, 548 F.2d 109 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 938 (1977); Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1018 (1975); Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell,
468 F.2d 1326 (2d Cir. 1972); Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1968), cert.
denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969).
3. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1976).
4. Transnational securities fraud problems have been frequently analyzed in legal peri-
odicals. See, e.g., Beard, International Securities Regulation-Absorption of the Shock, 10
INT'L LAW. 635 (1976); Goldman & Magrino, Some Foreign Aspects of Securities Regulation:
Towards a Reevaluation of Section 30(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 55 VA. L.
REV. 1015 (1969); Johnson, Application of Federal Securities Laws to International Securities
Transactions, 1980 FoRDHAM CORP. L. INST. 89 ; Karmel, Extraterritorial Application of the
Federal Securities Code, 7 CONN. L. REV. 669 (1975); Mizrack, Recent Developments in the
Extraterritorial Application of Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 30 Bus.
LAW. 367 (1975); Norton, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction of U.S. Antitrust and Securities Laws,
28 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 575 (1979); Note, Offshore Mutual Funds: Extraterritorial Applica-
tion of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 13 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 1225 (1972);
Note, Extraterritorial Application of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 69 COLUM. L. REV.
94 (1969); Note, The Extraterritorial Application of the Antifraud Provisions of the Securities
Acts, 11 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 137 (1978); Note, American Adjudication of Transnational
Securities Fraud, 89 HARV. L. REV. 553 (1976); Note, The International Character of
Securities Credit: A Regulatory Problem, 2 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 147, 155-64 (1970);
Comment, Securities Law-Subject Matter Jurisdiction in Transnational Securities Fraud-
Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc.-lIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 9 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 113
(1976); Note, Extra Territorial Application of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, 34 OIo ST. L.J.
342 (1973); Note, Extraterritorial Application of United States Laws: A Conflict of Laws
Approach, 28 STAN. L. REV. 1005 (1976); Comment, The Transnational Reach of Rule 10b-
5, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 1363 (1973); Note, Extraterritorial Application of the Federal Securities
Code: An Examination of the Role of International Law in American Courts, 11 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 711 (1978).
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ment (Revised) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States5
(Draft Restatement) represents the latest attempt to define a suffi-
cient basis for subject matter jurisdiction6 when a securities fraud is
transnational in character. 7 The circuit courts of appeals which
have considered the issue have formulated different approaches to
jurisdiction. 8 The Draft Restatement reflects yet another ap-
proach.9
This Note focuses on the jurisdictional problems raised by
fraudulent securities schemes involving minimum conduct within
the United States.' 0 In such schemes, the majority of the fraudulent
conduct, as well as the detrimental effects on American and foreign
investors, takes place in a foreign country. A United States court
must then decide whether it has subject matter jurisdiction; it must
determine whether the defendant's fraudulent conduct, both here
and abroad, may be adjudicated in an American, rather than a
foreign, forum.
This Note examines subject matter jurisdiction in transnational
securities fraud cases. The approaches adopted by the circuit courts
and the Draft Restatement are critically analyzed, and the lan-
guage and purpose of the Act are reviewed. A new test for deter-
mining subject matter jurisdiction in a United States forum is pro-
posed, which will result in greater protection of American and
foreign investors who purchase and sell securities abroad.
5. RESTATEMENT (REVISED) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES (Tent.
Draft No. 2, 1981) [hereinafter cited as DRAFT RESTATEMENT].
6. In this Note, the terms "subject matter jurisdiction" and "jurisdiction" will be used
interchangeably.
7. DRAFT RESTATEMENT, supra note 5, § 416.
8. See Grunenthal GmbH v. Hotz, 511 F. Supp. 582, 588 (C.D. Cal. 1981). Compare
Continental Grain (Austl.) Pty. Ltd. v. Pacific Oilseeds, Inc., 592 F.2d 409 (8th Cir. 1979)
(jurisdiction over transnational securities case where at least some activity in furtherance of
fraudulent scheme occurs within the United States) with Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519
F.2d 974 (2d Cir.) (antifraud provisions of the Act apply to losses from sales to Americans
residing abroad only if acts of material importance have significantly contributed thereto;
losses to foreigners residing abroad require direct causation by acts in the United States), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 1018 (1975).
9. See infra notes 64-75 and accompanying text.
10. This Note is not concerned with situations in which the effects of a fraudulent
scheme are felt within the United States and used, either alone or in conjunction with
conduct, as a jurisdictional basis. See infra note 29. This Note does not examine the use of
citizenship of a plaintiff or defendant as a basis for jurisdiction.
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I. THE STATUTORY LANGUAGE
The primary antifraud provisions are found in section 10(b)'1
of the Act and rule lOb-5,1 2 promulgated thereunder by the SEC.
Both contain similar language prohibiting fraudulent schemes
which make use of interstate commerce facilities. Section 10 of the
Act provides in relevant part:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly,
by the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate com-
merce or of the mails, or of any facility of any national securities
exchange-
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or
sale of any security registered on a national securities exchange
or any security not so registered, any manipulative or deceptive
device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regula-
tions as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropri-
ate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.' 3
The section does not set out its jurisdictional scope. Further-
more, the legislative history does not reveal congressional intent
regarding extraterritorial application. 4 Although the Act specifi-
cally applies to foreign commerce, 15 courts are without congres-
sional guidance when confronted with a fraudulent securities
scheme in which contacts with the American forum are minimal.
11. 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1976).
12. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1982). The rule provides in relevant part:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of
any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security.
Id.
13. 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1976).
14. See SEC v. Kasser, 548 F.2d 109, 114 n.21 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 938
(1977). The SEC has not offered any guidance by exercising its rulemaking powers. lIT v.
Cornfeld, 619 F.2d 909, 912 n.2 (2d Cir. 1980).
15. 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(17) (1976).
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II. THE SECOND CIRCUIT AND THE RESTATEMENTS
A. The Second Circuit
The Second Circuit, in Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook,'6 was the
first court of appeals to interpret the Act and apply the antifraud
provisions to a transnational securities fraud. 17 In Schoenbaum, an
American shareholder of Banff Oil, Ltd., a Canadian corporation,
brought a shareholder's derivative action for losses incurred from
sales of the corporation's treasury stock to the defendants, which
were also foreign corporations. 18 An alleged conspiracy between
Banff directors and the corporate purchasers of the stock caused
Banff to sell the stock at a market price which the defendants, who
had inside information, knew to be artificially low.' 9 An offer to
purchase the stock was mailed by the defendant's New York office,
although the actual sale took place in Canada. 20 Other uses of the
mails included communications with the United States Treasury
Department regarding tax rulings and with the American Stock
Exchange regarding the listing of additional shares.
2
'
Although the majority of the alleged fraudulent conduct oc-
curred outside the United States, the Schoenbaum court held that
subject matter jurisdiction existed "at least when the transactions
involve stock registered and listed on a national securities exchange,
and are detrimental to the interests of American investors."' 22 This
early decision construed the antifraud provisions to apply extrater-
ritorially in order to protect "domestic investors who have pur-
chased foreign securities on American exchanges and to protect the
16. 405 F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969).
17. Id. at 206. Prior district court cases were also divided over the scope of the antifraud
provisions. See Ferraioli v. Cantor, 259 F. Supp. 842 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) (securities laws only
apply to domestic acts which are the predicate for subject matter jurisdiction); SEC v. Gulf
Intercontinental Fin. Corp., 223 F. Supp. 987 (S.D. Fla. 1963) (jurisdiction over claim where
offer was made entirely outside of United States yet necessarily required use of the mails or
interstate commerce facilities); Kook v. Crang, 182 F. Supp. 388 (S.D.N.Y. 1960) (use of
mails and telephones within the United States does not provide jurisdiction for transactions
predominantly foreign in nature).
18. 405 F.2d at 204.
19. Id. at 205. Banff common stock was registered with the American Stock Exchange
and the SEC. Id. at 206.
20. Id. at 205.
21. Id. at 210. These negotiations with officials delayed the sale. Id.
22. Id. at 208.
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domestic securities market from the effects of improper foreign
transactions in American securities. '" 2 3
In determining what constituted sufficient use of interstate
commerce facilities, the court found that preliminary negotiations
in the United States in connection with the fraudulent scheme and
the mailing of a purchase offer from New York to Canada were
independently sufficient acts to bring the transaction within the
scope of section 10(b) .24 The Schoenbaum decision established sub-
ject matter jurisdiction over a transaction where there was domestic
conduct in furtherance of an allegedly fraudulent scheme and the
effects of that conduct were felt within the United States. 25
Subsequently, the Second Circuit relied on the Restatement
(Second) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States26 (Second
Restatement) in its attempt to define the jurisdictional boundaries
of the antifraud provisons. 27 Section 17 of the Second Restatement
sets forth the conduct principle, which permits a state to regulate
conduct occurring at least in part within its territory. 28 A compan-
23. Id. at 206. The Second Circuit followed the reasoning of the Supreme Court which
justified a state punishing a person who acted outside of the state's territorial limits, but who
caused intentional detrimental effects within the territory, provided that the state obtained
personal jurisdiction over him. Id. (citing Strassheim v. Daily, 221 U.S. 280, 285 (1911)).
24. 405 F.2d at 210. The court inferred that the preliminary negotiations with the
Treasury Department and the American Stock Exchange necessarily involved use of interstate
commerce facilities. Id. (citing Hooper v. Mountain States Sec. Corp., 282 F.2d 195, 204 (5th
Cir. 1960) (an interstate securities fraud case in which use of the mails constituted an
important step in the execution of the fraud and served as a jurisdictional predicate), cert.
denied, 365 U.S. 814 (1961)). The Schoenbaum court, however, found that the conduct was
not fraudulent and the plaintiff had therefore failed to state a cause of action. 405 F.2d at
211.
25. See 405 F.2d at 208; see also Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468
F.2d 1326, 1334 (2d Cir. 1972) (refusal to go beyond Schoenbaum where no fraud was
practiced in the United States and the sale took place abroad); United States v. Clark, 359 F.
Supp. 131, 134 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) ("fraudulent conduct in the United States resulting in sales of
securities abroad which have a substantial detrimental effect upon the interests of American
investors" encompassed by § 10(b)).
26. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES (1965)
[hereinafter cited as SECOND RESTATEMENT].
27. 519 F.2d 974, 985 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1018 (1975).
28. SECOND RESTATEMENT, supra note 26, § 17. The section, which is entitled "Jurisdic-
tion to Prescribe with Respect to Conduct, Thing, Status, or Other Interest within Terri-
tory," states that:
A state has jurisdiction to prescribe a rule of law
(a) attaching legal consequences to conduct that occurs within its territory,
whether or not such consequences are determined by the effects of the conduct
outside the territory, and
(b) relating to a thing located, or a status or other interest localized, in its
territory.
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ion provision, the effects principle, provides that a state may regu-
late conduct outside its territory which has foreseeable detrimental
effects within its territory.2 9
The Second Circuit, in its most important decision on the
issue, Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc. ,30 held that the conduct and
effects principles are mutually exclusive and either may serve as a
basis for jurisdiction.'I The court attempted to define the extraterri-
torial application of section 10(b) and rule 10b-5.32
In Bersch, an American citizen brought a class action on be-
half of both American and foreign shareholders of I.O.S., Ltd.
(1OS), a Canadian investment organization whose main office was
in Switzerland. 3 The class consisted of three groups: Americans
Id. Section 17 does not require that the conduct take place entirely within the prescribing
state's territory. Conduct in furtherance of a transnational securities fraud scheme, therefore,
need only partially take place within the United States for its courts to have jurisdiction. See
injra notes 48-63 and accompanying text.
29. SECOND RESTATEMENT, supra note 26, § 18. The section, which is entitled "Jurisdic-
tion to Prescribe with Respect to Effect within Territory," states that:
A state has jurisdiction to prescribe a rule of law attaching legal consequences to
conduct that occurs outside its territory and causes an effect within its territory, if
either
(a) the conduct and the effect are generally recognized as constituent elements
of a crime or tort under the law of states that have reasonably developed legal
systems, or
(b) (i) the conduct and its effect are constituent elements of activity to which
the rule applies; (ii) the effect within the territory is substantial; (iii) it occurs as a
direct and foreseeable result of the conduct outside the territory; and (iv) the rule is
not inconsistent with the principles of justice generally recognized by states that
have reasonably developed legal systems.
Id. In contrast to the conduct principle, the wording of § 18 specifically details the type of
effect that is a predicate for jurisdiction. Under the effects principle, the effect must be
"substantial" or a "constituent element of a crime or tort." Id. The qualifications suggest that
§ 18 was intended for conservative application.
30. Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1018
(1975).
31. See id. at 993, which formulates three fact situations in which the conduct and
effects principles are applied alternatively. Prior cases had implied that the two principles
were independent bases for jurisdiction although they had not specifically stated such a
holding. See Travis v. Anthes Imperial Ltd., 473 F.2d 515, 524 (8th Cir. 1973) (jurisdiction
where there has been significant conduct in the United States with respect to the alleged
violations); Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326, 1338-39 (2d
Cir. 1972) (although some domestic effects present, conduct formed the jurisdictional basis).
But see United States v. Clark, 359 F. Supp. 131, 134 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (substantial detrimen-
tal effects on American investors needed); Finch v. Marathon Sec. Corp., 316 F. Supp. 1345,
1349 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (absent effects in the United States, minor domestic conduct insuffi-
cient for jurisdiction).
32. 519 F.2d at 993.
33. Id. at 977-78. The class consisted of thousands of plaintiffs, the majority of whom
were citizens and residents of numerous countries throughout the world. Id.
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residing in the United States, Americans residing abroad and for-
eigners who had purchased their securities abroad. 34 Two of the six
defendant underwriters of the IOS offering were American, as was
the IOS accounting firm. 35 All of the defendants were charged with
material misrepresentations and omissions in connection with the
10S prospectus. 36 The plaintiffs alleged that they were unable to
ascertain the true value of 10S stock, which subsequently collapsed
in price as a result of fraud by IOS directors. 37 While the offering
itself was specifically intended to be made entirely outside the
United States, mainly to employees, present clients and investors of
long standing with 10S, some stock ultimately reached United
States investors through the mails. 38
Judge Friendly set forth a tripartite test for determining
whether a court may assert subject matter jurisdiction in a transna-
tional securities fraud action:
American securities laws:
(1) Apply to losses from sales of securities to Americans
resident in the United States whether or not acts (or culpable
failures to act) of material importance occurred in this country;
and
(2) Apply to losses from sales of securities to Americans
resident abroad if, but only if, acts (or culpable failures to act) of
material importance in the United States have significantly con-
tributed thereto; but
(3) Do not apply to losses from sales of securities to for-
eigners outside the United States unless acts (or culpable failures
to act) within the United States directly caused such losses. 39
The court held that there was jurisdiction over the claims of
Americans residing in the United States who had been mailed
prospectuses in this country. 40 The court based this decision on the
34. Id. at 993. The court did not address the question of sales within the United States to
foreigners. Id.
35. Id. at 979-80.
36. Id. at 981. This conduct constitutes a violation of the antifraud provisions of § 10(b)
of the Act. See supra notes 12-13 and accompanying text.
37. 519 F.2d at 981.
38. Id. at 980, 990-91. Although. there were actually three separate offerings, the court
found them to be integrated to such an extent that the defendants who made the offerings
could be considered collectively for subject matter jurisdiction. Id. at 992 n.43.
39. Id. at 993 (emphasis added).
40. Id. at 991.
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effects of the fraud within the United States, without the need to
consider conduct. 41 In the case of investors residing abroad, the
absence of such effects forced the court to examine conduct. 42 The
only conduct in the United States that contributed to the defraud-
ing of Americans and foreigners residing abroad was preparation by
the defendant accounting firm of a financial statement which was
used in the prospectus. 43 The court stated that while preparatory
acts would not serve as a jurisdictional predicate under the securi-
ties laws for injury to foreigners located abroad, such acts would
suffice when Americans residing abroad were injured. 44 The pre-
paratory activities in the United States did not directly cause the
losses to foreigners and therefore the court held that there was no
subject matter jurisdiction over their part of the claim. 45
In the absence of any domestic effects, the Second Circuit in
Bersch held that the conduct in the United States must be "mate-
rial" and "significantly" contribute to the fraud in order for a court
to have subject matter jurisdiction over a claim by an American
plaintiff who resides abroad. 46 A foreigner residing abroad, how-
ever, must prove that his losses are directly attributable to conduct
in the United States. 47 This reasoning requires a court to examine
the quality of the conduct in order to ascertain whether it is "mate-
rial" or "significant." For example, by focusing on whether conduct
is preparatory, a court analyzes the quality of that conduct.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. One commentator has suggested that use of American names as underwriters,
accountants and lawyers could serve as a basis for subject matter jurisdiction in order to
prevent defrauders from abusing American resources and prestige. See Note, American
Adjudication of Transnational Securities Fraud, 89 HARV. L. REV. 553, 570 (1976).
44. 519 F.2d at 992.
45. Id. at 987.
46. Id. at 993.
47. Id. The underlying reason for not hearing all transnational securities claims is found
in the language of the Bersch court: "When ... a court is confronted with transactions that
on any view are predominantly foreign, it must seek to determine whether Congress would
have wished the precious resources of United States courts and law enforcement agencies to
be devoted to them rather than leave the problem to foreign countries." Id. at 985. This
concern of overburdening the federal courts may be valid. However, it is not so strong an
argument as to deny a plaintiff his right to a remedy, especially if this is the only country in
which personal jurisdiction may be obtained over the defendant. See infra text accompanying
notes 144-49.
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B. The Second Restatement
The Bersch court specifically relied on the conduct principle of
the Second Restatement.48 The Second Restatement, however, does
not contain any restrictive adjectives such as "material" or "signifi-
cant. '49 The only qualifications are that (1) the conduct must be
within the territory of the country prescribing the law against it;
and (2) the proscribed conduct must relate "to a thing located, or a
status or other interest localized, in [the enacting nation's] terri-
tory." 50
A claim arising under section 10(b) and rule lOb-5 necessarily
involves a certain amount of conduct within the United States
because both provisions require use of interstate commerce facili-
ties. 5 ' The Second Restatement does not specify the amount of
conduct that must take place within the United States. 52 Therefore,
even a minimal amount of conduct, such as the use of interstate
commerce facilities in promoting the fraudulent scheme, should be
sufficient to satisfy the first qualification to the conduct principle. 53
The second qualification to the conduct principle, that the
proscribed conduct must relate to "interests localized" in the United
States,5 4 is also satisfied by the use of interstate commerce facilities
as required by the Act. The Supreme Court has long recognized the
power of the federal government under the mail fraud statute 55 to
protect the public from mail fraud schemes. 5 The use of the mails,
or any interstate commerce facility, serves as a basis for jurisdic-
tion, enabling the federal courts to assume jurisdiction over a cause
48. 519 F.2d at 985. The court was reluctant to apply its jurisdictional power to the
fullest extent possible absent specific authorization by the legislature. Id. See Leasco Data
Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326, 1334 (2d Cir. 1972).
49. See supra note 28.
50. Id.
51. See supra notes 11, 13 and accompanying text.
52. See supra note 28.
53. See Travis v. Anthes Imperial Ltd., 473 F.2d 515, 526 (8th Cir. 1973) ("[I]t is not
material who initiated the communications. Instead, the real question is whether the mails or
instrumentalities of interstate commerce were used to mislead the plaintiffs."); see also SEC
v. Gulf Intercontinental Fin. Corp., 223 F. Supp. 987 (S.D. Fla. 1963) (ads placed in
Canadian newspapers which are then offered for sale in the United States constitute offers
made within the United States).
54. See supra note 28.
55. 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1976).
56. See Durland v. United States, 161 U.S. 306 (1896).
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of action which might normally be brought in a state court.57 In
proscribing conduct which uses interstate commerce facilities in
furtherance of a fraud, the federal government is not solely inter-
ested in protecting investors. 58 Use of a state court might adequately
protect investors.5 9 The United States is also concerned with its role
as regulator of interstate commerce facilities.
60
The United States government has a direct interest in the use of
the postal system, interstate commerce facilities and national secur-
ities exchanges. The Second Circuit stated the necessity of prevent-
ing the use of the United States as a base from which fraudulent
securities schemes might be peddled abroad."' If interstate com-
merce facilities are used to further fraudulent schemes, then it
57. See Parr v. United States, 363 U.S. 370, 385 (1960) (fraud cause of action within
federal jurisdiction when mails were used to execute the fraudulent scheme). The use of
interstate banking channels to clear checks obtained in a fraud scheme results in federal
jurisdiction over the scheme. United States v. Sheridan, 329 U.S. 379 (1946); Kann v. United
States, 323 U.S. 88 (1944).
58. See Durland v. United States, 161 U.S. 306, 314 (1896) (dual purpose of the mail
fraud statute is to protect the public from mail fraud schemes and to prevent use of the Post
Office as a vehicle for carrying them into effect).
59. State courts, however, lack subject matter jurisdiction under the Act. Section 27 of
the Act gives the federal courts exclusive jurisdiction over all "actions at law brought to
enforce any liability or duty created by this chapter or the rules and regulations thereunder."
15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1976).
60. See Hooper v. Mountain States Sec. Corp., 282 F.2d 195, 202 (5th Cir. 1960) (broad
purpose of § 10(b) "to keep the channels of interstate commerce, the mail, and national
securities exchanges pure from fraudulent schemes, tricks, devices, and all forms of manipu-
lation"), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 814 (1961).
Section 10(b) proscribes conduct when "necessary or appropriate in the public interest."
15 U.S.C. § 78j (1976). In transnational securities regulation, this interest includes consider-
ations of foreign and monetary policy. Regulation of securities transactions, both in this
country and abroad, has an effect on the ability of American corporations to raise capital.
Preservation of the integrity associated with American securities markets is important "to
promote the free flow of capital" to these corporations thereby creating a favorable balance
of payments. Karmel, supra note 4, at 705.
Another interest of the federal government is to provide a uniform system of regulation
over securities markets and investors. See 15 U.S.C. § 78b (1976).
61. liT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1017 (2d Cir. 1975). The case was decided the
same day as Bersch, both cases having arisen out of the same fraudulent scheme. In Vencap, a
Luxembourg investment trust brought suit against a Bahamian corporation and individuals
for, among other things, fraud and conversion. The court found that effects on Americans
were insufficient to form a jurisdictional basis because Americans were only .2% of the total
number of fundholders and had invested at most .5% of the total funds. Id. at 1016-17.
There existed an abundance of activity within the United States, including preparation of a
document which formed the basis of the fraudulent conduct. Id. at 1016. Judge Friendly
stated: "We do not think Congress intended to allow the United States to be used as a base for
manufacturing fraudulent security devices for export, even when these are peddled only to
foreigners." Id. at 1017. See Note, Extraterritorial Application of United States Securities
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appears that the United States is remiss in preventing schemes from
being formed within its borders, thereby exposing investors abroad
to potential economic harm. 2 Thus, the second requirement of the
conduct principle is fulfilled. The specific wording of the Second
Restatement permits a court to assume jurisdiction over a cause of
action where conduct within the United States, not necessarily
significant or material, furthers a fraudulent scheme. 3
C. The Draft Restatement
The position of the Second Circuit in Bersch, which used a
quality analysis approach to determine whether the conduct was
"significant," has been strengthened by the Draft Restatement. A
special section concerning jurisdiction over transnational securities
transactions has been created. 4 This section requires an examina-
tion of the interests of the United States in applying American laws
to an international transaction, as well as an examination of the
interests of a foreign state in applying its own laws. 5 The Draft
Laws (lIT v. Vencap, Ltd.), 42 Mo. L. REV. 158, 167 (1977) (jurisdictional principles should
serve a descriptive rather than a normative function in policy analysis).
62. Lenient regulation of fraud may encourage other countries to engage in similar
practice. Continental Grain (Austl.) Pty. Ltd. v. Pacific Oilseeds, Inc., 592 F.2d 409, 421
(8th Cir. 1979); SEC v. Kasser, 548 F.2d 109, 116 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 938
(1977).
63. See supra note 28.
64. DRAF-r RESTATEMENT, supra note 5, § 416. The section, which is entitled "Jurisdic-
tion over Securities Transactions," provides in part:
(2) As regards transactions in securities not on a securities market in the United
States, but where
(a) securities of the same issuer are traded on a securities market in the
United States; or
(b) representations are made or negotiations are conducted in the United
States in regard to the transactions; or
(c) the party subject to the regulation is a United States national or resident,
or the persons sought to be protected are residents of the United States,
the authority of the United States to exercise jurisdiction to prescribe depends on its
reasonableness in the light of evaluation under § 403(2).
65. These interests are considered when determining whether it is reasonable to exercise
jurisdiction. Section 403(2) of the Draft Restatement provides:
(2) Whether the exercise of jurisdiction is unreasonable is judged by evaluating
all the relevant factors, including:
(a) the extent to which the activity (i) takes place within the regulating state,
or (ii) has substantial, direct, and foreseeable effect upon or in the regulating
state;
(b) the links, such as the nationality, residence, or economic activity, be-
tween the regulating state and the persons principally responsible for the activity
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Restatement approach evolved from the quality analysis reasoning
utilized by the Second Circuit.6 6 The Bersch test also considered the
interests of the United States in assuming jurisdiction whendeter-
mining whether the conduct within the United States was "suffi-
ciently significant. 6
7
Under the Draft Restatement, jurisdiction to prescribe a law
regulating transnational securities fraud depends on whether it is
"reasonable," in light of certain enumerated factors, for an Ameri-
can court to assume jurisdiction. 8 These factors include: the qual-
ity of the conduct in the state, the interests of the state in regulating
conduct or effects of a scheme, the interests of a foreign state in
asserting jurisdiction, and the expectations of the parties involved
that the conduct will be subject to regulation by the United States.69
The comments to the Draft Restatement state that the primary
purpose of the securities laws is to protect domestic markets and
investors. 70 These comments further note that the antifraud provi-
sions should be applied more liberally than other provisions of the
Act, such as the "requirements of registration or disclosure [which
are] not immediately directed at preventing fraud."'7 The Draft
Restatement, however, fails to use minimal conduct within the
to be regulated, or between that state and those whom the law or regulation is
designed to protect;
(c) the character of the activity to be regulated, the importance of the
regulation to the regulating state, the extent to which other states regulate such
activities, and the degree to which the desirability of such regulation is generally
accepted;
(d) the existence of justified expectations that might be protected or hurt by
the regulation in question;
(e) the importance of regulation to the international, political, legal or
economic system;
(f) the extent to which such regulation is consistent with the traditions of the
international system;
(g) the extent to which another state may have an interest in regulating the
activity;
(h) the likelihood of conflict with regulation by other states.
Id. § 403.
66. Id. § 416 reporter's note 1.
67. Id. See supra text accompanying note 39.
68. DRAr RESTATEMENT, supra note 5, § 416.
69. Id. § 403(2). For a list of the interests, see supra note 65. These enumerated factors
are not meant to be exhaustive. DRAfr RESTATEMENT, supra note 5, § 403 comment b, § 416
reporter's note 5.
70. DiRtr RESTATEMENT, supra note 5, § 416 comment a.
71. Id. See infra notes 136-42 and accompanying text.
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United States as a basis for jurisdiction. 72 Conduct, such as prelimi-
nary negotiations in the United States, "would be one factor to be
evaluated along with other factors." 73
This approach goes further than the Second Circuit, which
requires more than preparatory activity in the United States when
the actual defrauding occurs abroad.7 4 Examination of the other
factors required by the Draft Restatement, however, would pre-
clude the foreign plaintiff, in the majority of cases, from asserting
his claim in an American court. 5
III. AN EXPANSIVE APPROACH USING CONDUCT AS A
JURISDICTIONAL BASIS
The Third and Eighth Circuits have taken a more expansive
view of subject matter jurisdiction than the Second Circuit and the
Draft Restatement. These circuits require a lesser degree of conduct
in the United States in connection with the fraudulent scheme in
order for a plaintiff to assert a section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 claim. 76
In determining a basis for subject matter jurisdiction these two
courts have specifically examined the amount of conduct within the
United States, rather than whether such conduct is "significant. 77
72. DRAFr RESTATEMENT, supra note 5, § 403(2). All of the relevant factors must be
evaluated in determining whether it is reasonable to exercise jurisdiction. Id.
73. Id. § 416 reporter's note 3.
74. See supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text.
75. Minimal domestic conduct or effects would imply that it is unreasonable for the
United States to assert jurisdiction. Minimal conduct in the United States implies that an
assertion of jurisdiction by an American court would be more likely to offend foreign
sovereignty. Moreover, the costs in time and money of bringing suit in a United States court
might deter an American court from asserting jurisdiction. See supra note 47. Vigorous
enforcement of the antifraud provisions when there is some connection with the United
States, such as minimal conduct, provides a greater deterrence to defrauders, thereby pro-
tecting investors abroad.
76. Compare Continental Grain (Austl.) Pty. Ltd. v. Pacific Oilseeds, Inc., 592 F.2d
409 (8th Cir. 1979) and SEC v. Kasser, 548 F.2d 109 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 938
(1977) (only some activity within the United States in furtherance of the fraudulent scheme is
required for subject matter jurisdiction) with Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974
(2d Cir.) (requirement of material conduct significantly contributing to the fraud for Ameri-
can plaintiffs who reside abroad, and requirement of direct causation of losses from domestic
acts for foreigners residing outside the United States), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1018 (1975).
77. The Second Circuit in Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d
1326 (2d Cir. 1972), used the phrase "essential link" to describe conduct occurring in the
United States which induced a purchase in London. Id. at 1335.
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A. The Third Circuit
The Third Circuit in, SEC v. Kasser,78 analyzed the problem
of subject matter jurisdiction by examining the quantity of conduct
in the United States and whether it furthered the fraudulent
scheme. In Kasser, a Canadian development fund 79 was, by mis-
representations,80 induced into acquiring debentures of two corpo-
rations owned by the defendants.8' Activity in the United States in
connection with the scheme included: (1) various negotiations; (2)
the execution of one investment contract; (3) use of interstate com-
merce facilities; (4) incorporation or maintenance of business of-
fices; and (5) use of a foreign bank's offices in New York as a
conduit for money received from the fund.8 2 The court held that
subject matter jurisdiction exists in transnational securities fraud
cases "where at least some activity designed to further a fraudulent
scheme occurs within this country. ' 83
The Kasser court emphasized the quantity, rather than the
quality, of conduct within the United States. Nevertheless, the
court noted its position was consistent with that of the Second
Circuit.8 4 While basing its decision on conduct occurring within the
78. 548 F.2d 109 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 938 (1977).
79. The SEC brought the action seeking injunctive relief on behalf of the Manitoba
Development Fund, owned by the Province of Manitoba, Canada. Id. at 110-12. This fact
implies Canadian approval of the suit in the United States, thereby decreasing the likelihood
of Canadian sovereignty being offended by an American court.
80. Misrepresentations of a material fact are a violation of rule 10b-5. See supra text
accompanying note 13.
81. 548 F.2d at 111.
82. Id. Other activities noted by the circuit court, but not used by the district court,
included maintenance of business records, drafting of contracts executed abroad and trans-
mittal of proceeds within the United States. Id.
83. Id. at 114 (emphasis added).
84. Id. at 115. This quantitative approach is reflected in the court's comparison of the
conduct involved in Kasser with that found in lIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001 (2d Cir.
1975). The Kasser court felt that the "sum total" of the defendant's actions within the United
States was "more substantial" than in Vencap, possibly directly causing extraterritorial losses.
548 F.2d at 115.
The Third Circuit was apparently unwilling to let its decision stand solely on a qualita-
tive theory of subject matter jurisdiction. Instead, the court in Kasser reconciled its holding
with language used by the Second Circuit. Id. The Kasser court may have been reluctant to
move too far from the approach of the Second Circuit, a court which is recognized as having
a certain amount of expertise in securities law. Id. at 115 n.29 (citing Blue Chip Stamps v.
Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 762 (1975) (Blackmun, J., dissenting, referring to the
Second Circuit as "the Mother Court" of securities law)).
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United States, the court also gave policy reasons for asserting juris-
diction. "[T]o deny such jurisdiction may embolden those who wish
to defraud foreign securities purchasers or sellers to use the United
States as a base of operations . . . . 5 [A] holding of no jurisdiction
might induce reciprocal responses on the part of other nations. 86
Finally, to grant jurisdiction would allow the SEC to police vigor-
ously in order to maintain "high standards of conduct in securities
transactions within this country. . . [and to protect] domestic mar-
kets and investors from the effects of [securities] fraud [committed
outside the United States]." 87 These policy reasons are better effec-
tuated by use of an expansive concept of subject matter jurisdiction,
one which requires only some conduct to take place within the
United States. 88
B. The Eighth Circuit
The Eighth Circuit subsequently addressed the problem of
subject matter jurisdiction in Continental Grain (Australia) Pty.
Ltd. v. Pacific Oilseeds, Inc. " Although the degree of domestic
conduct present9" was less than that in Kasser,9' the Eighth Circuit
found that Kasser was an extension of the boundaries of subject
matter jurisdiction.9 2 Quoting Kasser, the Eighth Circuit held that
The Kasser court had no need to reconcile its holding with the Second Circuit. A
qualitative approach to jurisdiction, in which a minimal amount of conduct occurs in the
United States, is justified. See infra notes 111-49 and accompanying text.
85. 548 F.2d at 116.
86. Id. Similarly, the court hoped that a finding of jurisdiction would "encourage other
nations to take appropriate steps against parties who seek to perpetrate frauds in the United
States." Id.
87. Id. It was also noted that jurisdiction should be determined according to the literal
wording of the statute. Section 10(b) and rule lOb-5 are primarily concerned with preventing
fraudulent conduct and should therefore be broadly interpreted to include fraudulent
schemes that are not consummated. Id. at 114.
88. Basing jurisdiction on some domestic conduct is a broad interpretation of jurisdic-
tion which is consistent with other broad constructions of the Act. For example, the definition
of "interstate commerce" includes trade, commerce, transportation or communications with
any "foreign country." 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(17) (1976).
89. 592 F.2d 409 (8th Cir. 1979).
90. The conduct consisted, for the most part, of preliminary communications among
the defrauders through the use of interstate commerce facilities. Id. at 415.
91. See supra notes 79-82 and accompanying text.
92. 592 F.2d at 418. Prior opinions from the Southern District of New York had
interpreted Bersch and Vencap as requiring "that the domestic conduct constitute the ele-
ments of a rule 10b-5 violation." Id. (citing F.O.F. Propriety Funds, Ltd. v. Arthur Young &
Co., 400 F. Supp. 1219, 1222-23 (S.D.N.Y. 1975)). See Venture Fund (Int'l) N.V. v. Willkie
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subject matter jurisdiction exists "where at least some activity de-
signed to further a fraudulent scheme occurs within this country. 9 3
Continental Grain, an Australian corporation, was a wholly-
owned subsidiary of a Delaware corporation. 4 Continental Grain
purchased all the stock of Pacific Seeds Pty. Ltd., also an Australian
corporation, from three vendors.9 5 Two of the vendors were named
as defendants, one an individual residing in California, the other an
American corporation.9" The third vendor, Australian Chemical
Holdings, Ltd. ,97 an Australian corporation, was not made a party
to the action. 98 The third defendant, an American corporation, had
a licensing agreement to supply Pacific Oilseeds with hybrid seed-
stock.9 9 The continued availability of this seedstock under terms of
the licensing agreement constituted the primary asset of Pacific
Seeds. 00 Continental Grain alleged that the defendants had agreed
not to disclose the intended reclamation of the seedstock by the
licensor upon termination of the licensing agreement.' 0 '
Conduct in the United States included transpacific telephone
calls and letters through which the managing director of Australian
Chemical, who acted as agent for the sellers, and the two American
defendant-vendors agreed to conceal the termination of the licens-
ing agreement.' 0 2 The defendants never had any direct contact with
Continental Grain. 10 3 The contract for the sale of Pacific Seeds
Farr & Gallagher, 418 F. Supp. 550, 555 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); Finch v. Marathon Sec. Corp.,
316 F. Supp. 1345, 1348 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
93. 592 F.2d at 418-19 (quoting Kasser, 548 F.2d at 114). The Eighth Circuit has been
criticized for this interpretation of Kasser. See Note, Continental Grain v. Pacific Oilseeds:
Unjustifiable Expansion, 2 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 264 (1980); Note, A Policy Approach to
Subject Matter Jurisdiction in Transnational Securities Fraud Cases: Continental Grain
(Australia) Party, Ltd. v. Pacific Oilseeds, Inc., 17 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 263 (1980).
94. 592 F.2d at 411.
95. Id.
96. Id. Pacific Oilseeds, Inc. (POI), a California corporation, owned 48% of Pacific
Seeds stock. Id. Claassen, a California resident and president of POI, owned 1% of the stock
in question. Id.
97. Australian Chemical owned 51% of the stock of Pacific Seeds. Id.
98. Id. at 414. One possible reason may have been that joinder of Australian Chemical
to the action would have defeated diversity jurisdiction. Id. at 414 n.5.
99. Id. at 411. This licensor, Northrup, King & Co., a Minnesota corporation, had a 10-
year license agreement to supply Pacific Seeds with hybrid seedstock. Id.
100. Id. It was the intent of Northrup, however, to reclaim all seedstock within Pacific
Seeds' possession upon termination of the contract. Id.
101. Id. Claassen telephoned a representative of Northrup to urge Northrup not to
"spoil the deal" with Continental Grain by revealing Northrup's intended reclamation. Id.
102. Id. at 411-12.
103. Id. at 412. The agent for the vendors handled all the negotiations in Australia.
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stock was executed in California, but the closing occurred in Aus-
tralia. 104
The court rejected the view that use of interstate commerce
facilities by the defendants was "merely preparatory." 0 5 The court
found that letters and telephone calls within the United States were
necessary for furtherance of the fraudulent scheme, 10 6 and indeed,
"constituted the organization and completion of the fraud." 07
While the Eighth Circuit maintained that the domestic con-
duct involved was "significant,"'' 0 8 thus reconciling its view with
the Second Circuit, 09 the facts point to an opposite conclusion." 0
Because the defrauding occurred abroad, with little conduct in this
country, the Eighth Circuit's holding can be interpreted to mean
that a minimal amount of conduct is sufficient as a basis for subject
matter jurisdiction.
IV. ANALYSIS
Subject matter jurisdiction based on minimum conduct within
the United States, although not specifically stated by the Third and
Eighth Circuits, is supported by use of the term "some" conduct.
Furthermore, this use of minimum conduct as a jurisdictional basis
is a justifiable position.
A. Policy Considerations
Although the legislative history of the Act fails to disclose
congressional intent,"' the language of the Act provides some guid-
104. Id. The closing was held outside the United States for tax reasons. Id. at 412-13.
105. Id. at 420.
106. Id. Proceeds from the sale were transmitted through interstate commerce facilities
and representatives of POI were flown to Australia for the closing and then back to the
United States. Id.
107. Id. The court did not explain how the fraud could be "completed" in the United
States when all the negotiations and the closing were carried out in Australia.
108. Id.
109. See supra notes 28, 39 and accompanying text.
110. In spite of the court's finding that the domestic conduct was not preparatory, the
conduct still appears to be minimal. A close analysis of the facts shows: (1) the conduct in the
United States consisted of the planning of the fraud; (2) the actual defrauding took place in
Australia where the defendants' agent failed to disclose to representatives of Continental
Grain the intended reclamation of the seedstock upon termination of the licensing agreement;
and (3) the final closing occurred in Australia. Therefore, the conduct in the United States
appears to be merely preparatory. See 592 F.2d at 411-12.
111. See supra note 14.
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ance in determining its jurisdictional scope.1 2 This language sup-
ports an expansive view of jurisdiction under the antifraud provi-
sions.
Section 10(b) states that "[i]t shall be unlawful for any person,
directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or instrumentality of
interstate commerce or of the mails, or any facility of any
national securities exchange.""13 to execute a fraudulent securities
scheme. The statute does not contain any limiting adjectives or
qualifiers. 114
The antifraud provisions of the Act have always been broadly
construed to afford investors the greatest possible protection." 5
Minimal conduct as a basis for subject matter jurisdiction is permis-
sible under the wording of the statute and, in fact, better effectu-
ates the remedial purposes of the Act."'
The deterrent effect " 7 linked with vigorous enforcement of the
antifraud provisions 18 is a justifiable preservation of United States
integrity. The circuit courts" 9 agree that strong enforcement dis-
courages those who wish to make the United States a "Barbary
Coast" from which fraudulent securities schemes may be peddled
abroad. 120
112. 15 U.S.C. § 78j; see supra text accompanying note 13. The language of § 10(b) is
similar to that found in rule 10b-5. See supra notes 11-13 and accompanying text.
113. 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1976).
114. On the contrary, the wording is quite liberal in prohibiting the direct or indirect
use of interstate commerce facilities. See supra text accompanying note 13 for the relevant
language of § 10(b).
115. The antifraud provisions of § 10(b) are "to be construed 'not technically and
restrictively, but flexibly to effectuate [their] remedial purposes.' " Affiliated Ute Citizens v.
United States, 406 U.S. 128, 151 (1972) (quoting SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, 375
U.S. 180, 195 (1963)).
116. A greater number of injured plaintiffs, who might not otherwise be able to obtain
relief in another jurisdiction, are afforded a chance to have their suit heard in at least one
forum where the requirement of "some" or minimal conduct in furtherance of a fraudulent
scheme has occurred. See infra notes 144-49 and accompanying text.
117. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
118. See supra notes 11-13 and accompanying text.
119. See Continental Grain (Austl.) Pty. Ltd. v. Pacific Oilseeds, Inc., 592 F.2d 409,
420-21 (8th Cir. 1979); United States v. Cook, 573 F.2d 281, 284 (5th Cir. 1978); SEC v.
Kasser, 548 F.2d 109, 116 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 938 (1977); IIT v. Vencap, Ltd.,
519 F.2d 1001, 1017-18 (2d Cir. 1975); Grunenthal GmbH v. Hotz, 511 F. Supp. 582, 587
(C.D. Cal. 1981).
120. Kasser, 548 F.2d at 116.
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Unrestrained use of section 10(b) would prevent any fraudu-
lent schemes from deriving their beginnings in the United States.' 21
Strict regulation of minimal conduct in the United States in connec-
tion with a fraudulent securities scheme provides a greater deter-
rence. Potential defrauders are put on notice that the highest degree
of honesty and fairness is to be maintained in securities transac-
tions, and that securities fraud, even though only in an embryonic
stage, will not be tolerated in the United States.
Vigorous enforcement of the antifraud provisions of the Act
may result in other nations relying on the United States for regula-
tion of international securities fraud. 122 Restrained application of
the antifraud provisions by the United States may also cause other
nations to ease their own prosecution of securities fraud.1 23 Rather
than relying on regulation by other sovereigns, American courts
should encourage the SEC to become an enforcement model for
other nations. 2 4 Thus, the highest standards of conduct will be
maintained in both domestic and transnational securities transac-
tions.
By the very nature of a transnational claim, any regulation
imposed on a party in the United States will necessarily affect the
party in another jurisdiction. 25 If the United States maintains it has
the right to regulate conduct within its territory, then other states,
which may have stronger claims because of the occurrence of con-
121. Vigorous enforcement of the antifraud provisions would elevate the general stand-
ard of conduct in securities transactions. Continental Grain, 592 F.2d at 421; Kasser, 548
F.2d at 116.
122. The implication of this possible situation might prove to be a burden on United
States judicial and law enforcement resources. Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d
974, 985 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1018 (1975). See supra note 47.
123. Kasser, 548 F.2d at 116 ("[A] holding of no jurisdiction might induce reciprocal
responses on the part of other nations.").
124. Id. One commentator, however, has suggested that limited use of the antifraud
provisions in transnational cases will encourage other nations to develop their own regulatory
systems to protect investors. As these nations apply their own laws, the need for the United
States to regulate transnational fraud would decrease. See Note, Offshore Mutual Funds:
Extraterritorial Application of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 13 B.C. INDUS. & CoM.
L. REV. 1225, 1254-55 (1972).
125. A transnational transaction involves conduct in more than one country. A foreign
nation may have its own antifraud provisions which it may choose to apply absent, or in spite
of, an American judgment.
The United States has cooperated with foreign countries to avoid conflicts in and
duplication of transnational fraud cases. See Beard, International Securities Regulation-
Absorption of the Shock, 10 INT'L LAW. 635, 648-51 (1976).
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duct in their territory, may resent the assertion of jurisdiction by
courts in the United States.1
26
This concern for the sovereignty of other states, where there
also exists conduct in furtherance of the fraudulent scheme or the
fraud itself occurs, is reflected in the doctrine of comity. 27 While
the United States is not under an obligation to respect a foreign
court's concurrent jurisdiction over a claim, 28 failure to do so may
be offensive to the other state. Such a failure may result in the
foreign state's refusal to give effect to a judgment by an American
court, which the foreign state believes has a lesser claim to jurisdic-
tion. 2 9 Thus, an approach to subject matter jurisdiction which only
considers conduct in the United States may offend another state's
sovereignty. 30
While another country may consider exercise of its own sover-
eign rights to be superior to that of the United States in a transna-
tional securities fraud case, the United States does have a right to
assert subject matter jurisdiction because of the occurrence of some
part of the conduct within its own territory. In order for section
10(b) and rule 10b-5 to apply, the facilities of interstate commerce
must have been used in furtherance of the scheme.' 3' It follows that
126. See infra notes 133-42 and accompanying text.
127. "[Comity] is the recognition which one nation allows within its territory to the...
acts of another nation, having due regard both to international duty and convenience, and to
the rights of its own citizens or of other persons who are under the protection of its laws."
Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 164 (1895).
128. See Comment, An Interest Analysis Approach to Extraterritorial Application of
Rule 10b-5, 52 TEX. L. REV. 983, 984 (1974) (respect for international law is meant to prevent
retaliation, unenforceable judgments, multiple trials and inconsistent liabilities).
129. See Loomis & Grant, supra note 1, at 16-18 (discussing the problems of secrecy
inherent in Swiss banking laws).
130. However, an approach which looks for minimal conduct within the United States
as a jurisdictional basis over a securities fraud is consistent with decisions involving conduct
taking place entirely within this country. Continental Grain (Austl.) Pty. Ltd. v. Pacific
Oilseeds, Inc., 592 F.2d 409, 421 (8th Cir. 1979). See Kerbs v. Fall River Indus., 502 F.2d
731 (10th Cir. 1974); Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718 (8th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S.
951 (1968).
In cases involving strictly interstate conduct, for example the use of telephones entirely
within one state in furtherance of a fraudulent scheme, the federal courts have been willing
to assume jurisdiction even though the court of the state in which the conduct occurred has a
stronger claim to subject matter jurisdiction. See Weiss v. United States, 308 U.S. 321, 327
(1939). See also Dupuy v. Dupuy, 511 F.2d 641, 643 (5th Cir. 1975) ("[l]t seems somewhat
anomalous to assume ... that on the one hand, Congress and the SEC meant to erect a
comprehensive statutory scheme for the prevention of securities fraud, and on the other,
intended to narrowly circumscribe its scope of operation.").
131. See supra notes 11-13 and accompanying text.
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if the United States is to preserve its position as regulator of these
facilities, it should strictly control all domestic conduct which pro-
motes the fraud so that potential defrauders may be deterred.1 2
Although exercise of jurisdiction based solely on conduct in the
United States may be offensive to the sovereignty of another
state, 1 33 it is equally true that the laws of the United States have
been violated. Any use of United States interstate commerce facili-
ties as part of an overall fraudulent securities scheme affects an
interest localized in this country. 34 The federal government, there-
fore, has the right to prohibit fraud promoted by use of its instru-
mentalities. 135
In this respect, the antifraud provisions may be distinguished
from the registration 36 and margin requirements 37 found else-
where in the securities laws. The assertion of jurisdiction by an
American court over a transnational fraud claim hardly interferes
with the economic policies of the foreign countries. Rather, the
American court is merely providing a remedy for an accepted
wrong. 138
Similarly, the antifraud provisions may be distinguished from
the antitrust laws. "' Extraterritorial application of American anti-
trust laws has been criticized primarily because of the interference
with the foreign country's economy and internal policy. 40 Applica-
132. See supra text accompanying notes 117-21.
133. See Note, Extra Territorial Application of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, 34 Omo
ST. L.J. 342, 352 (1973).
134. The "interstate commerce facilities use" theory has been advocated by the SEC.
See Brief for the SEC (amicus curiae) at 18, Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200 (2d Cir.
1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969).
The theory is that the United States has a direct interest in the use to which the
facilities of interstate commerce are put, and that, because of its plenary power over
the use of the facilities of interstate commerce, Congress may outlaw any use,
however incidental, which is connected with fraudulent purposes.
SEC v. United Fin. Group, Inc., 474 F.2d 354, 357 n.6 (9th Cir. 1973). Although no court
has specifically adopted the theory, the SEC has not abandoned the argument. Loomis &
Grant, supra note 1, at 11.
135. See Comment, supra note 128, at 984.
136. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 781 (1976); Securities Act of 1933, § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 77e
(1976).
137. 15 U.S.C. § 78g (1976). See Widmer, The U.S. Securities Laws-Banking Law of
the World? (A Reply to Messrs. Loomis and Grant), 1 J. CoMp. CoRP. L. & SEC. RE. 39, 40
(1978).
138. See IIT v. Cornfeld, 619 F.2d 909, 921 (2d Cir. 1980).
139. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (1976).
140. See Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am., 549 F.2d 597, 609 (9th Cir. 1976);
United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 443 (2d Cir. 1945). See also Comment,
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tion of section 10(b) and rule lOb-5 in a transnational fraud case,
however, causes minimal impact on the economy of a foreign coun-
try. 141 Capital formation in foreign countries actually may be en-
couraged because there will be less risk of fraud upon American
investors. 142
The problem of competing claims to sovereignty has been
approached from various perspectives in recent years. The estab-
lished jurisdictional principles, such as the conduct principle, and
the now developing interest analysis approach of the Draft Restate-
ment, have sought to provide a solution to the problem without
violating the sovereignty of a foreign state. The interest analysis
approach strives to permit the exercise of jurisdiction without caus-
ing resentment in other countries, even though the United States
may permissibly be exercising its sovereign right to jurisdiction. 43
B. A Hypothetical Study
Use of the conduct principle of the Second Restatement 144 is
preferable to the developing interest analysis of the Draft Restate-
ment. 45 There are situations which may be envisaged in which the
United States would not have jurisdiction under the interest analy-
sis approach although it would have jurisdiction under the conduct
principle.
Consider the following hypothetical. While in the United
States, A and B, two foreigners, conspire to defraud C, also a
foreigner, of his stock. The stock in question is that of a foreign
corporation which only does business in Europe where C resides.
Conduct in the United States consists of letters exchanged by A and
B which contain preliminary drafts of a contract for the sale of the
stock and suggestions as to the final means to be used in defrauding
C. The actual defrauding, the final drafting and the signing of the
Defining Jurisdictional Limits in International Antitrust: Should the EEC Adopt the Tim-
berlane Approach?, 5 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 469 (1982).
141. Criticism of extraterritorial application of the antitrust provisions has focused on
use of the effects principle as a jurisdictional basis. See DRAnr RESTATEMENT, supra note 5, §
403 reporter's note 1.
142. See Bloomenthal, Extraterritorial Application of United States Securities Laws-
Recent Developments, 2 SEC. & FED. CoRP. L. REP. 114, 116 (1980). But see Widmer, supra
note 137, at 39 (burden of judging whether a transaction is fraudulent is on the investor).
143. See Comment, supra note 128, at 984.
144. See supra note 28.
145. See supra notes 64-75 and accompanying text.
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contract by C take place in Europe. C then sues A and B in the
United States.
Under the established conduct principle, the United States
would have jurisdiction over a section 10(b) cause of action because
some conduct, even though minimal, has occurred in this country
and furthered a fraudulent scheme. Moreover, this conduct pro-
moted the fraud through use of interstate commerce facilities. 14
The Second Circuit would dismiss such a claim on the grounds that
the conduct was merely preparatory. 47 The Draft Restatement
would refuse jurisdiction because of the preponderance of foreign
interests over American interests in hearing the claim. 148 Only the
minimum conduct principle utilized, but not enunciated, by the
Third and Eighth Circuits protects C, the injured party who is
seeking relief, by providing a forum. 49
CONCLUSION
The approaches taken by the circuit courts and the Draft
Restatement are possible solutions to a complicated problem of
jurisdiction. None of the approaches provides a clear and definitive
test for the courts to apply when confronted with a case involving
minimal conduct within the United States and a plaintiff who
resides abroad.
The Second Circuit requires that the conduct be "significant"
in the case of an American plaintiff residing abroad, while a foreign
plaintiff must show that the losses are directly attributable to the
domestic conduct. 50 The facts must be analyzed in each case. The
quality of the conduct is then examined in order to determine
whether it is of a type that will provide a basis for subject matter
jurisdiction. This qualitative determination is subjective and may
result in inconsistent decisions where the facts are similar.' 5'
146. See supra notes 51-53 and accompanying text.
147. See supra text accompanying notes 44-45.
148. See supra notes 64-75 and accompanying text.
149. The discrepancy in views is even more pronounced if C is unable to obtain personal
jurisdiction over A and B in a foreign jurisdiction or it is not possible to extradite A and B
under a treaty.
150. See supra text accompanying note 39.
151. A question that arises following determination of subject matter jurisdiction is
whether the American forum should decline to adjudicate the case. See Comment, Securities
Law-Subject Matter Jurisdiction in Transnational Securities Fraud-Bersch v. Drexel Fire-
stone, Inc.-lIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 9 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 113 (1976), in which the
MINIMAL CONDUCT APPROACH
Furthermore, the deterrent value of the antifraud provisions is
undermined. Only a broad application of section 10(b) will prevent
a defrauder from escaping justice and deter others from using the
United States as a base for fraudulent transactions in securities.
The interest analysis approach of the Draft Restatement will
also result in inconsistent decisions based on a subjective determina-
tion of factors such as the quality of the domestic conduct. More-
over, although the established conduct principle does not so re-
quire, the Draft Restatement considers the interests of a foreign
state in determining subject matter jurisdiction. The United States
should have jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case based
upon conduct in this country. The interests of other states and the
alternative of bringing suit in a foreign country should not interfere
with the right of the United States to regulate conduct within its
territory.
The Third and Eighth Circuits have provided greater deter-
rence by requiring only minimal conduct in the United States.
These courts have exhibited a reluctance, however, to depart from
the language of the Second Circuit. Rather than reconciling their
holdings with the Second Circuit, courts should strive for a broad
interpretation of the Act. Minimal domestic conduct as a basis for
subject matter jurisdiction designates the United States as a model
of enforcement which other nations may emulate. It will, further-
more, allow more defrauded investors the opportunity to obtain
relief and will elevate the standards of conduct associated with
international securities transactions.
Edward A. Taylor
author suggests this is the more difficult question. One escape for a court is dismissal on the
grounds of forum non conveniens. This doctrine assumes subject matter jurisdiction, but
allows dismissal based on considerations of convenience, fairness to the parties and witnesses,
and burden on the forum. See A. EHRENZWEIG & E. JAYME, PIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW §
180-1 (1973) (enunciation of factors to be considered by the court); see also Note, Forum Non
Conveniens: Standards for the Dismissal of Actions From United States Federal Courts to
Foreign Tribunals, 5 FoRDHAM INT'L L.J. 533 (1982).
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